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ALTERNATIVE FORMS Of JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 
Mark Tushnet* 
The invention in the late twentieth century of what I call 
weak-form systems of judicial review provides us with the chance to 
see in a new light some traditional debates within U.S. constitutional 
law and theory, which are predicated on the fact that the United States 
has strong-form judicial review.1 Strong- and weak-form systems oper­
ate on the level of constitutional design, in the sense that their charac­
teristics are specified in constitutional documents or in deep-rooted 
constitutional traditions. After sketching the differences between 
strong- and weak-form systems, I turn to design features that operate 
at the next lower level. Here legislatures or courts specify whether 
their enactments or decisions will receive strong- or weak-form treat­
ment. I examine examples of legislative allocations of issues to 
strong- and weak-form review and identify some practical and 
conceptual problems with such allocations. Then I examine judicial 
allocations - of the courts' own decisions - to strong- or weak-form 
categories. Here I consider Thayerian judicial review and what 
Professor Dan Coenen has called semisubstantive doctrines as exam­
ples of judicial choices to give their decisions weak-form effects. 2 My 
conclusion is that these allocation strategies reproduce within 
strong- and weak-form systems the issues that arise on the level of 
constitutional design. Weak-form systems and allocation strategies 
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law 
Center. B.A. 1967, Harvard; J.D. 1971, M.A. (History) 1971, Yale. - Ed. This Essay is one 
of a series on modern forms of judicial review. Its specific focus arose from comments by 
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong on a draft of one of those essays, Forms of Judicial Review as 
Expressions of Constitutional Patriotism, 22 LAW & P HIL. 353 (2003), and I am indebted to 
Professor Sinnott-Armstrong for turning my thought in this direction. I also profited from 
comments at a presentation at Seattle University Law School and by Barry Friedman, Jeff 
Goldsworthy, and Lorraine Weinrib. 
1. For definitions of strong- and weak-form judicial review, see Section I.A infra. As the 
ensuing discussion indicates, the assertion that weak-form systems were invented in the late 
twentieth century may be overstated. Perhaps a more accurate statement would be that judi­
cial review was invented in a weak form, but became transformed over two centuries to the 
point where weak-form systems had to be reinvented, with novel design features, in the late 
twentieth century. 
2. Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with 
Second-Look Rules of lnterbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575 (2001) 
[hereinafter Coenen, Constitution of Collaboration]; Dan T. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, 
Structural Due Process, and Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1281 
(2002) [hereinafter Coenen, The Rehnquist Court]. 
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may seem to alleviate some difficulties associated with strong-form 
systems in constitutional democracies. My analysis suggests that those 
difficulties may persist even when alternatives to strong-form judicial 
review are adopted. 
I. STRONG- AND WEAK-FORM JUDICIAL REVIEW - SOME 
DISTINCTIONS 
A. The Basic Distinction 
For perhaps a century the nature of judicial review in the United 
States was uncertain. Although Marbury v. Madison confirmed that 
the U.S. Supreme Court had the power to declare unconstitutional a 
statute enacted by Congress, the scope of the Marbury power, and its 
relation to the Constitution-interpreting roles of the other branches, 
remained contested for decades. Marbury can be taken to establish a 
system of what some scholars call a departmentalist system of judicial 
review. 
Departmentalism comes in two variants. In the first, each 
department has sole responsibility for determining the constitutional­
ity of actions by other departments affecting its own operation. 3 
Marbury is a departmentalist decision in this sense because the Court 
determined that Congress had improperly rearranged the 
Constitution's allocation of power within the judiciary.4 In the second 
variant of departmentalism, each branch has a constitutional right -
or perhaps even a duty - to act on its own best interpretation of the 
Constitution, no matter what the other branches have said.5 Marbury 
is departmentalist in this sense too, because the Court rejected a rea­
sonable interpretation of the Constitution, adopted by Congress and 
the president in enacting the Judiciary Act provision invalidated there, 
in favor of its own interpretation. 6 
3. The basic studies of departmentalism are ROBERT L. CLINTON, MARBURY v. 
MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1989), and SHANNON c. STIMSON, T HE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION IN THE LAW: ANGLO-AMERICAN J URISPRUDENCE BEFORE JOHN 
MARSHALL (1990). 
4. Most of the precedents for judicial review were departmentalist in this sense, involv­
ing, typically, statutes affecting the role of juries. 
5. For an overview of this position, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The ."vlost Dangerous 
Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994). 
6. In this version of departmentalism, the views of the other branches play two roles. 
First, those views are entitled to respectful consideration, as data bearing on each 
department's own interpretation, but they are not conclusive. Second, the fact that one 
department disagrees with another has implications for the prudential judgment about what 
ought to be done given the disagreement. Sometimes the costs to the constitutional system 
of a department insisting on its own interpretation, in terms of stability and the like, may be 
so large as to justify the department in refusing to act on its own judgment while insisting on 
its power to do so. 
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Departmentalism in its first variant was a reasonable description of 
constitutional practice for much of the nineteenth century. Vigorous 
constitutional debates about the tariff, the scope of Congress's power 
to subsidize "internal improvements" such as roads that would link 
one part of the nation to another, and - of course - slavery took 
place in Congress and in presidential campaigns.7 For example, 
Andrew Jackson vetoed the act rechartering the Bank of the United 
States, partly because he thought that, the Supreme Court 
notwithstanding, Congress lacked the power to charter a bank. The 
veto message stated: "The opinion of the judges has no more authority 
over Congress than the opinion of Congress has over the judges, and 
on that point the President is independent of both."8 
At some point this departmentalist practice weakened substan­
tially. 9 The people of the United States, acting through our institu­
tions, had to define the contours of our system of judicial review 
because the Constitution says nothing about the institution. Judicial 
review changed from the means by which the courts expressed their 
view of the Constitution's meaning, in a system where other institu­
tions expressed their own independent views, to a mechanism for 
lodging responsibility for constitutional interpretation in a single insti­
tution, the judiciary.10 So, for example, in 1935 Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt advised a member of Congress to put aside his constitu­
tional doubts and "leav[ e] to the courts, in an orderly fashion, the 
ultimate question of constitutionality."1 1  Cooper v. Aaron asserted that 
the Court's interpretations bind all political actors.1 2 And, though an 
assertion by the Court of its own power cannot make it so, Cooper has 
7. For some examples, see H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: 
THE CONSTITUTION IN HISTORY AND POLITICS (2002); KEITH WHITTINGTON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 
(1999); and Mark Graber, Resolving Political Questions into Judicial Questions: 
Tocqueville's Thesis Revisited, Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American 
Political Science Association (2000) (on file with author). 
8. 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 576, 581-82 (James Richardson ed., 
1900). 
9. I am unaware of a definitive history identifying with any precision the period when 
departmentalism substantially disappeared. The possibilities range, I think, from the late 
nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth. 
10. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), clearly assumes that the U.S. system is 
strong-form and, as I will argue, Thayerian judicial review does so as well. In light of the lat­
ter point, I suppose we can say that strong-form review existed - as a target for Thayer's 
analysis, at least - by the 1890s. 
11 .  KATHLEEN A. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 22 (14th 
ed. 2001). Roosevelt continued with words that can be given a slightly more departmentalist 
reading: "A decision by the Supreme Court relative to this measure would be helpful as indi­
cating {the] constitutional limits within which this Government must operate." Id. (emphasis 
added). "Helpful as indicating" is more departmentalist than, for example, "would indicate" 
would have been. 
12. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
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been taken to be at most a slightly overstated formulation of the 
nondepartmentalism that characterizes contemporary judicial review 
in the United States.'3 
Strong-form judicial review rejects both forms of departmentalism. 
In strong-form judicial review, the courts have general authority to 
determine what the Constitution means.14 And, more important for 
present purposes, the courts' constitutional interpretations are 
authoritative and binding on the other branches, at least in the short to 
medium run. 1 5  
The strong-form aspect of the U.S. system became the model for 
the constitutional courts adopted by other nations after World War II, 
even as system-designers rejected other aspects of the U.S. system.16 
For example, the German Constitutional Court, perhaps the world's 
leading constitutional court after the U.S. Supreme Court, is a 
strong-form court.17 And, for many years, it seemed that judicial 
review meant strong-form review, a fact that provided an argument 
against the institution for those concerned about giving a substantial 
policymaking role to (mere) judges.18 
The possibilities for institutional design changed, however, when 
the drafters of Canada's Charter of Rights invented weak-form judi-
13. Citing additional Supreme Court cases such as Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 
428 (2000), and City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), would not support this asser­
tion, but perhaps citing the controversy over Attorney General Edwin Meese's assertion in a 
1987 speech of a moderate departmentalist view will. For citations, see SULLIVAN & 
GUNTHER, supra note 11 ,  at 25-26. 
14. Whatever limits there are on that authority, such as those imposed by the political 
question doctrine or interpretive approaches counseling deference to the policy judgments 
of the other branches, originate from the courts themselves. For a discussion of the 
difference between deferential review and Thayerian review, see infra text accompanying 
notes 64-65. 
15.  Judicial interpretations are not absolutely binding, first, because they can be 
overturned by a constitutional amendment, which in principle could occur quite rapidly (as 
occurred with the Eleventh Amendment), and second, because they can be rejected as new 
justices are appointed to the Court and constitutional doctrine changes. 
16. For example, system-designers seem to have believed that judicial independence 
could be secured without giving the judges life tenure, and that doing so promoted other im­
portant constitutional values. Some system-designers also apparently believed that systems 
of judicial review should incorporate as expressly as possible the judgment that constitu­
tional review was a task that combined legal and political dimensions. 
17. Although German legal theorists took some time to reconcile the practice of 
strong-form review with their jurisprudential assumptions. For brief discussions, see DA YID 
P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 169 n.346 
(1994), and DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 54 (2d ed. 1997). 
18. Often this concern is phrased as one about the diminution of a people's 
self-governing capacity when courts exercise strong-form review. Understood in that way, 
the concern is alleviated, if not eliminated, when the people knowingly acquiesce in strong­
form review. For a discussion. see Mark Tushnet, Forms of Judicial Review as Expressions of 
Constitutional Patriotism 22 LAW & PHIL. 353 (2003). 
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cial review in 1981. 19 The Charter's now-famous Section 33 allows the 
legislature to determine that a statute would go into effect 
notwithstanding its possible conflict with specified Charter provisions. 
One point of the notwithstanding clause was to give the Canadian 
Supreme Court a role in constitutional interpretation without making 
that Court's judgments completely authoritative in the short run. A 
legislature that disagreed with the court's interpretation could reenact 
the legislation found invalid, protecting against a subsequent challenge 
by invoking Section 33.20 
Section 33 appears to have encouraged other system-designers to 
think creatively about the forms of judicial review. For present 
purposes I need mention only two, the New Zealand Bill of Rights and 
the British Human Rights Act of 1998. The former directs the courts 
to interpret all legislation so as to make the legislation compatible with 
the Bill of Rights, but gives the courts no power to refrain from 
enforcing statutes that, fairly read, are inconsistent with the Bill of 
Rights. 21 The latter couples the interpretive directive with a judicial 
power to declare a statute incompatible with guaranteed rights and an 
ensuing ministerial power to modify the statute rapidly, to bring it into 
compliance with those rights. 22 
19. For a discussion of the circumstances under which the invention occurred, see 
PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA (3d ed. 1992). 
20. The story did not develop quite as the inventors imagined. For complex reasons -
one of which may have been the infelicity of drafting § 33 to refer to action notwithstanding 
the Charter's provisions rather than action notwithstanding a judicial interpretation of those 
provisions -§ 33 has, I believe, turned out to be something of a nonprovision in Canadian 
constitutional law. The fact that § 33 can be used prior to a judicial interpretation, thereby 
protecting against even an initial judicial interpretation, probably makes sense, but both in 
theory and in practice such prospective uses create problems. The terms of a provision 
authorizing prospective uses would have to be quite complex to capture the idea that a pro­
spective use was guarding against a Supreme Court misinterpretation of the Charter. The 
actual prospective uses, by Quebec as part of its struggle for independence and by Alberta to 
protect against an anticipated Supreme Court holding that laws barring gays from marrying 
violate equality norms, have not given the prospective use of § 33 a good name in Canadian 
constitutional culture. For a discussion, see Mark Tushnet, New Forms of Judicial Review 
and the Persistence of Rights- and Democracy-Based Worries, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 813 
( 2003) [hereinafter Tushnet, New Forms of Judicial Review]. 
My view of§ 33, I should note, while not idiosyncratic, is one that is quite controversial 
among Canadian constitutionalists (when asserted by Canadian scholars who have studied 
the system more than I have). Those who assert that§ 33 has operated well, and as intended, 
note that it was not designed with frequent use in mind, and that its existence has had an ef­
fect on structuring statutory design, so that rare recourse to § 33 does not show that the pro­
vision has been ineffective. 
21. The Canadian Charter of Rights displaced an earlier Canadian Bill of Rights, which 
provided the model for the New Zealand Bill of Rights. 
22. See Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 
AM. J.  COMP. L. 707 (2001), for a discussion of these forms of judicial review. I prefer the 
label weak-form to "Commonwealth model," because I do not think that there is any intrin­
sic connection between the form of judicial review and the fact that the best examples come 
from the Commonwealth. Weak-form systems are a natural response to a desire to impose 
judicially enforceable limits on legislative action in nations where the tradition of parliamen-
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The mark of weak-form review is not that the scope of judicial 
review is narrow. Courts in weak-form systems have the power to 
evaluate all legislation to determine whether it is consistent with all of 
the constitution's provisions without exception. Rather, the mark of 
weak-form review is that ordinary legislative majorities can displace 
judicial interpretations of the constitution in the relatively short run. 23 
Weak-form review responds to the concern that strong-form review 
allows courts with an attenuated democratic pedigree to displace deci­
sions taken by bodies with stronger democratic pedigrees. Yet, weak­
form systems raise their own concerns - primarily, that weak-form 
review, to use Marbury's terms, converts the Constitution into an "or­
dinary legislative act[] ... alterable when the legislature shall please to 
alter it. " 24 
Strong-form and weak-form judicial review are ways of structuring 
judicial review. Scholars of constitutional structure have given insuffi­
cient attention, I believe, to the question of who selects the form of 
review. The remainder of this Article addresses that question. 
B.. The Level of Institutional Choice 
As presented so far, the choice between strong- and weak-form 
judicial review seems to occur at the most fundamental level of institu­
tional design. Sometimes the choice is made by the constitution's 
designers and is memorialized in the constitution; sometimes � 
nation's legal culture gradually accepts the proposition that judicial 
review takes a strong or a weak form.25 But, once we see that there is 
more than one form of judicial review, we can consider whether 
strong- and weak-forms can be created at the next level of institutional 
operation - not by the constitution's designers themselves, but by the 
legislators and judges who implement the constitution.26 The idea here 
tary sovereignty is strong and has continuing support among politically relevant actors. 
Commonwealth nations may provide the best examples of such governments, but they are 
not the only ones. 
23. Weak-form review thus rejects the first variant of departmentalism while embracing 
the second. 
24. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). This statemen.t is inaccurate 
with respect to weak-form systems that place some procedural impediments in the way of 
easy legislative response, but each such impediment moves the purportedly weak-form sys­
tem some way down the line toward strong-form systems. 
25. The United States exemplifies the first of these gradualist paths. Perhaps Sweden 
exemplifies the second. The Swedish Constitution of 1915 created a constitutional court with 
the power of judicial review, but that court did not find primary legislation unconstitutional 
for more than seven decades. A culture of weak-form review may be one explanation, but so 
may be the language of the Swedish Constitution, which enjoins the court to "set aside" a 
statute "only if the fault is manifest." Swed. Const., Ch. 11 ,  art. 14, available at 
http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/swOOOOO_.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2003). 
26. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong characterized these forms of judicial review as intermedi­
ate between strong- and weak-form. As indicated in the text, I believe it is better to concep-
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is that legislators and judges can allocate particular issues or statutes 
to strong- or weak-form judicial review, while leaving other issues to a 
default form of review.27 
There are, however, asymmetries in the choices available in 
strong- and weak-form systems. Legislators in a system of weak-form 
review on the constitutional level can require courts to exercise 
strong-form review, thereby relinquishing their own power to revisit 
the issues they remit to the courts.28 But, the courts in a weak-form 
system cannot themselves choose to exercise strong-form review.29 
And, in parallel fashion, courts where the default position established 
by the constitution is strong-form review can decide for themselves to 
allow legislatures to "override" the courts' decisions on some matters, 
by issuing decisions that, through a variety of doctrinal devices, are by 
their own terms merely provisional.30 But, legislatures in a strong-form 
system cannot require that courts make their decisions on some 
questions readily revisable. 
These asymmetries complicate the exposition of designs that allow 
for choice between strong- and weak-form review at the legislative 
and judicial levels. Although my primary concern is with constitutional 
design in general, my primary strategy for addressing this difficulty is 
to draw examples from periods when it remained unsettled whether 
the U.S. system was strong- or weak-form.31 In doing so, I do not mean 
tualize them as dealing with the creation of judicial review at a different level than the 
constitution. For me, an intermediate form of review would be one that adopted something 
like a moderately strong form of departmentalism coupled with a moderately strong form of 
judicial exclusivity. I do not know how such a system could be designed, and, in general, I am 
skeptical of the stability of anything other than truly strong-form systems or truly weak-form 
ones. For a discussion of the possible instability of Canada's purportedly weak-form system, 
see Tushnet, New Forms of Judicial Review, supra note 20. 
27. Or, at least in theory, to a default of no review at all. In the modern world, however, 
designers of constitutional systems have universally chosen to insert judicial review into their 
designs. 
28. Subject to an important qualification discussed in Part II of this Essay. 
29. Except, of course, as a move in a long-term process through which weak-form re­
view is converted into strong-form review. 
30. A note on Dormant Commerce Clause review in the United States is appropriate 
here. The Supreme Court has held that its determinations that state regulations "unconstitu­
tionally" interfere with interstate commerce can be revised by Congress, through statutes 
that give states permission to enact the laws the Court invalidated. See, e.g., In re Rahrer, 140 
U.S. 545 (1891). For a discussion, see William Cohen, Congressional Power to Validate 
Unconstitlllional State Laws: A Forgotten Solution to an Old Enigma, 35 STAN. L. REV. 387 
(1983). One can view this doctrine as a choice by a strong-form Court to engage in 
weak-form review. Alternatively, one can view it as a doctrine that does not involve judicial 
review at all, seeing the courts as agencies exercising a power Congress delegated to them 
that is subject to ordinary congressional review and oversight. 
31 .  Or, at least, I invite readers to consider the examples on the assumption that the 
choice remained open at the constitutional level. (Of course I also provide examples from 
situations where the asymmetries do not matter.) 
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to suggest that all the possibilities I discuss are available now that the 
U.S. system has become a strong-form one. 
II. ALLOCATION BY THE LEGISLATURE 
Mark Graber's analysis of Dred Scott32 and the abortion cases33 
illustrates the strategy of legislative allocation.34 According to Graber, 
legislative majorities in those instances invited the courts to resolve a 
constitutional controversy. In the 1850s, the Northern and Southern 
wings of the congressional Democratic Party - together, a working 
majority in Congress - found it impossible to resolve their differences 
on the issue of whether Congress had the power to ban or regulate 
slavery in the territories. The party's leaders solved their problem by 
inviting the Supreme Court to decide the question, supporting the 
Dred Scott litigation in the lower courts and signaling the justices that 
the party leaders would welcome the Court's intervention. They would 
then defer to the Court, invoking the idea of strong-form review to 
justify their refusal to do anything other than go along with the Court. 
Graber also suggests that, less consciously, deferring the abortion 
issue to the courts solved problems within both the Republican and 
Democratic party coalitions.35 Republicans were divided between an 
older, northeastern wing and an emerging southern and western wing 
that was more conservative on social issues than the Rockefeller 
Republicans of the northeast. Democrats were divided between a 
Catholic working-class constituency and limousine liberals. The abor- , 
tion issue divided both party coalitions. Sending the issue to the courts 
allowed party leaders to avoid taking a position on legislation in a 
setting where taking any position would be politically damaging. And, 
notably, once the courts acted in a legal culture accepting strong-form 
review, the internal divisions became much less pressing: In each 
party, critics of the Court could have their say without forcing their 
coalition partners to do anything, because in a strong-form system 
there was nothing that could be done in the short run to respond to 
the Court. 
Neil Devins has identified another contemporary version of this 
phenomenon. Devins notes the numerous statutory provisions 
providing for rapid Supreme Court review of constitutionally conten-
32. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
33. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
34. Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the 
Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993). 
35. I emphasize that, while there is evidence that party leaders consciously sought 
Supreme Court resolution of the slavery issue, there is no sue!) evidence - nor does Graber 
claim there is - that party leaders were similarly conscious about deferring the abortion 
issue to the courts. 
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tious legislation such as the Line Item Veto Act and campaign finance 
reform.36 In some formal sense perhaps, Congress takes the position 
that its enactments conform to the Constitution. But, the fast-track 
judicial review provisions also indicate uncertainty within Congress 
(that is, by enough members of Congress to make inclusion of a fast­
track review provision a politically sensible thing to do) about the cor­
rectness of its position. And, finally, these provisions indicate 
Congress's willingness to accept the Court as the final arbiter of the 
constitutional questions. It would be churlish indeed for Congress, 
having invited the Supreme Court to decide the constitutional ques­
tion, to assert in departmentalist terms that the Court's views are 
interesting and relevant but not binding. 
Yet, this sort of statutory charge to the Court to exercise 
strong-form review raises its own questions. Of course, the very 
Congress that invited the Court to decide is unlikely to rise up in 
outrage at what the Court does. But, the Dred Scott and abortion 
examples suggest that a perspective that has a slightly longer time ho­
rizon might give a different answer to the question of whether legisla­
tors will accept the Court's decisions and, thus, whether the Court 
actually can exercise strong-form review. The Dred Scott decision 
rapidly became a central issue of political contention, as the new 
Republican party exploited the decision to exacerbate tensions within 
the constituencies supporting the Democratic party. Dred Scott was 
decided in 1857. Less than a year later, the decision was a central fea­
ture in Abraham Lincoln's campaign against Stephen A. Douglas for a 
Senate seat to represent Illinois in Congress, a campaign that pushed 
Lincoln into the national spotlight. The national majority that elected 
Lincoln in 1860 repudiated Dred Scott politically.37 The Dred Scott 
story shows that a legislative allocation of a constitutional question to 
a nominally strong-form system may not achieve the intended goal.38 
One can generalize a bit from the Dred Scott story. Legislative 
allocations to strong-form review can succeed as long as legislators -
and, importantly, those elected to succeed the initial enactors -
accept, not just the Supreme Court's decision, but also the initial deci-
36. Neil Devins, Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred on the Court's 
Anti-Congress Crusade, 51 DUKE L.J. 435 (2001). 
37. And, formally, Dred Scott was repudiated by the first sentence of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, adopted after the Civil War in 1868. See U.S. CON ST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("All 
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside."). 
38. The abortion story is somewhat more complicated, involving as it does the quite 
gradual erosion of the position of northeastern Republicans within that party, coupled with 
the nomination and confirmation of federal judges hostile to the Supreme Court's abortion 
decisions. While the Dred Scott story indicates how a legislative allocation to a strong-form 
system may fail, the abortion story suggests that the legislative allocation can succeed 
because strong-form systems are defined by the power of courts to make their decisions stick 
in the medium to long run, as the abortion decisions have. 
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sion to defer the issue to the courts. The issue purportedly taken off 
the table by the first legislature will reappear if members of the second 
legislature want it to.39 
The reason arises from the asymmetry discussed earlier. A legisla­
ture can allocate issues to strong-form review only if the system is 
weak-form on the constitutional level. I use a stylized version of the 
events surrounding Ex parte McCardle to illustrate the point.40 After 
the Civil War, Congress engaged in a program of military occupation 
of the formerly rebellious states. The program's constitutionality was 
open to serious question. Congress enacted a statute expanding the 
scope of habeas corpus as part of the Reconstruction effort. One 
incidental consequence of that statute, whose implications were 
probably not foreseen, was an expansion of the scope of the Supreme 
Court's authority to review lower court decisions in habeas corpus 
cases. We can describe this as Congress inviting the Supreme Court to 
determine the Reconstruction program's constitutionality. An oppo­
nent of Congress's Reconstruction program took up the invitation and 
brought a habeas corpus petition to the Supreme Court using the new 
statute's procedures. Fearful that the Supreme Court might strike 
down the Reconstruction program, Congress then repealed the provi­
sion expanding Supreme Court review. Having put the constitutional 
question on the Court's agenda, in a manner akin to the one Graber 
describes, Congress then took it off the agenda. 
Ex parte McCardle asked whether Congress could actually do that. 
That is, the issue in McCardle was whether one Congress could 
foreclose another Congress from withdrawing the invitation to the 
Court to decide the constitutional question. The Supreme Court said 
no; the initial decision by Congress could not bar a later one from 
taking jurisdiction away from the Court. Interpreting the 
Constitution's provisions dealing with Congress's power to regulate 
the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, the Court held that Congress's 
power was plenary, and that it was "not at liberty to inquire into the 
motives of the legislature."41 McCardle, seen in the light cast by my 
argument, is a case in which the legislature in a system with weak-form 
judicial review invited the Supreme Court to exercise strong-form 
review, and then revoked the invitation, reinstituting the default 
system. 
The McCardle Court went along with Congress's decision. It might 
(in theory at least) have refused to do so. Such a decision would have 
been an assertion that power - here, the power to exercise 
39. In effect, the later legislature says to the earlier one, "You're no longer around and 
can't do anything to bind us to the decision you made." 
40. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). Stylization helps because the events as they actually 
unfolded are not precisely what is needed to make the point discussed in the text. 
41. Id. at 514. 
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strong-form review - once delegated cannot be retrieved: The earlier 
legislature's decision does bind the later one by means of judicial 
enforcement of the earlier one's choice. But, does this .make concep­
tual sense? After all, there is a long standing maxim of constitutional 
and statutory law, lex posterior derogat legi priori, meaning that "later 
law overrules earlier law." Why should not this maxim apply to the 
second legislature's revocation of the first legislature's allocation of an 
issue to strong-form review? 
We can see why it is indeed applicable by considering why the 
maxim does not apply when a statute is challenged as inconsistent with 
an earlier adopted constitution. In some sense, all constitutions 
involve an irretrievable delegation of power.42 The people create a 
constitution that imposes restrictions on the people later on, as they 
act through their elected representatives. So, if constitutionalism is a 
form of irretrievable delegation, why could not the legislative authori­
zation of strong-form review in a system whose constitution specifies 
weak-form review be similarly irretrievable? 
European constitutional theory provides the answer.43 That theory 
distinguishes between the people acting in their capacity to create a 
constitution, and the people acting within the framework of the consti­
tution they have created. It describes the former as the pouvoir 
constituant - the constituting power - and the latter as the pouvoir 
constituee - the constituted power. The pouvoir constituee is subordi­
nate to the pouvoir constituant, so, while the constituting power can do 
whatever it wants, constituted powers may not. The real bite of the 
distinction comes in thinking through its institutional implications. 
European constitutional theorists tend to insist that different institu­
tions must exercise the two powers. A constitutional convention can 
constitute power, but a legislature cannot. More generally, according 
to these theorists, action on the level of the pouvoir constituant can 
bind actors on the subordinate level, but, they say, an actor cannot 
bind future actors on the same level: A new constitutional convention 
can completely displace what a prior constitutional convention did, 
and a later legislature can completely repudiate what a prior one did.44 
Seen in this light, and putting the specifics of the U.S. Constitution 
aside, the stylized version of Mccardle shows why a legislative strategy 
of allocating issues to strong-form review in a system of weak-form 
review on the level of constitutional design may be unstable. Political 
42. As before, irretrievable must be understood here to mean "irretrievable without 
going through some extraordinary procedures." 
43. For an introduction to this aspect of European constitutional theory, see Andrew 
Arato, Forms of Constitution and Making Theories of Democracy, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 191 
(1995). 
44. Unless, of course, the constitution itself limits what later legislatures can do, for 
example through ex post facto clauses. 
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circumstances arising in the short run might lead to new legislation 
revoking the allocation. And, because the distinction between weak­
and strong-form review depends entirely on whether judicial decisions 
can be displaced by political ones in the short run or only in the long 
run, this means that the strategy of legislative allocation is not, in prin­
ciple, distinct from weak-form judicial review created at the constitu­
tional level. 
III. ALLOCATION BY THE COURTS 
A court in a strong-form system may decline to exercise the power 
it has, not simply by exercising whatever discretion it may have to 
select cases or by invoking justiciability doctrines of its own making,45 
but also by casting its decisions in expressly provisional terms or by 
upholding legislation after applying a standard of review generous to 
the legislature. In the first mode, the court may hold that the action at 
issue might be permissible if taken by one body, such as the executive, 
but is not permissible when taken by another. Or, it may hold that the 
legislature has the power to accomplish its apparent goals, but only in 
a statute that states those goals more clearly than the one before the 
court. In the second mode, the court may find the legislation in some 
tension with constitutional norms, but not so obviously unconstitu­
tional as to justify the court's displacing the legislature's choice. 
Both modes of decision may be seen as choices by the courts to 
exercise weak-form review. Yet, one can question the efficacy of such 
choices. Exercises of provisional review may degenerate into - or 
may be disguises for - strong-form review, in situations where the 
cost to the legislature of revisiting the issue is greater than the benefit 
of doing so. This is normatively troubling when there is some social 
gain from the initial legislation. The theory of provisional review is 
that the legislature can do better for the society by a more carefully 
drafted statute, for example. But, if no alternative statute could be en­
acted for practical political reasons, society loses the benefit of the 
badly drafted statute, without the court taking responsibility for lim­
iting society's choices in the name of the constitution, as it does when 
it openly exercises strong-form review. 
The difficulty with deferential review is subtler. The kind of 
deferential review with which I am concerned occurs when the court 
acknowledges that its understanding of the constitution leads it to 
conclude that the statute is inconsistent with constitutional norms, but 
defers to the legislature's understanding, which it treats as reasonable' 
albeit erroneous. The question about this kind of deferential review is: 
45. The focus of Alexander Bickel's discussion in T HE LEAST DANGEROUS  BRANCH: 
T HE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLIT ICS (1962). 
August 2003] Alternative Forms of Judicial Review 2793 
What does it accomplish in a system committed to strong-form 
review? 
A. Judicial Choices to Make Review Provisional 
Courts with the power to make conclusive decisions need not exer­
cise that power, though they may have a duty to decide in favor of one 
or the other litigant. They may exercise provisional rather than 
conclusive review - suspending the effect of a statute pending its re­
consideration by the legislature, while holding out the promise that the 
legislation, or something quite like it, will be allowed to go into effect 
the next time around. Dan Coenen has recently compiled a catalogue 
of devices for provisional review, and carefully analyzed each.46 Rather 
than repeat his survey in detail, I provide a few examples as the basis 
for a discussion of two points: the extent to which provisional review is 
truly provisional, and the extent to which the devices of provisional 
review can be used by courts in allocating issues to weak-form review. 
Justice Hans Linde and the Supreme Court introduced the idea of 
provisional review to modern U.S. constitutional law in 1976. Justice 
Linde's article Due Process of Lawmaking argued that the way in 
which laws were enacted and by whom should affect the courts' later 
assessment of their constitutionality, independent of the statutes' 
substance.47 Using this rationale, in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong the 
Supreme Court held unconstitutional a regulation adopted by the Civil 
Service Commission that barred resident aliens from civil service 
positions.48 The Court agreed that such a ban might serve valuable 
foreign-policy goals, but concluded that the Civil Service Commission 
lacked the expertise - and the power - to promote U.S. foreign pol­
icy in this way. Professor Coenen describes Hampton as a case holding 
that the Constitution prescribes who must make particular decisions 
without limiting the substance of those decisions once made by the 
proper body.49 It exemplifies weak-form judicial review as well, 
because no special procedures other than ones within the control of an 
ordinary legislature need be followed - no supermajorities, no 
extended consideration, nothing beyond a process that could have 
been used in enacting the statute in the first place. 
Professor Coenen elaborates a large number of similar rules, which 
he describes as "how" rules - ones that tell legislatures how to go 
about accomplishing the goals they seek in a constitutionally permissi-
46. Coenen, Constitution of Collaboration, supra note 2; Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, 
supra note 2. 
47. 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976). 
48. 426 U.S. 88 (1976). 
49. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, supra note 2, at 1370-74 (describing other "who" de­
cisions as well). 
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ble way. The most obvious examples are clear-statement rules, which 
in terms say explicitly that the Constitution does not preclude the 
legislature from a particular goal but does require that the legislature 
specify with some care exactly what it proposes to do.50 Professor 
Coenen points out that rules sometimes criticized as exalting form 
over substance have the same "how" structure.51 He uses the example 
of the Court's Dormant Commerce Clause cases. There the Court has 
expressly said that discriminatory taxes can have the same adverse 
effects on interstate commerce that discriminatory subsidies do, but 
that discriminatory subsidies are permissible and discriminatory taxes 
prohibited. 52 
In all of these areas, and many others, the Supreme Court says, in 
effect: 
You can do what you seem to want to do, but you haven't gone about it 
in the right way. If you really care about this, go back and try again. If 
you follow our directions about who has to make the decision, and how it 
must be expressed, we'll uphold it against a renewed challenge. 
So, for example, after Hampton the president repromulgated the ban 
on aliens in the civil service, and the courts upheld the renewed ban 
because the president was the right person to make foreign"policy 
decisions.53 Notably, the repromulgation occurred within a very short 
period after the Supreme Court's initial decision, thus demonstrating 
in concrete terms how the case exemplifies weak-form judicial review. 
Yet, one can raise some questions about whether these devices are 
generally versions of weak-form review or rather disguised forms of 
strong-form review. The concern is that the devices hold out the hope 
of reenactment followed by unsuccessful constitutional challenge, 
but may be used in circumstances where practical politics make 
reenactment extremely unlikely. 
The tax-subsidy cases provide a useful starting point. The theory 
behind the cases is that express subsidies will attract more political 
attention within the enacting state, because they involve appropria­
tions, and therefore will be more difficult to enact than discriminatory 
taxes will be. That is to say, though, that the courts know that taxes 
and subsidies are economically equivalent devices but are politically 
different. Striking down a discriminatory tax while saying that a 
50. Vagueness cases are similar, in that they involve judicial determinations, not that a 
legislature cannot accomplish a particular goal, but that the statute the legislature has 
adopted does not identify clearly enough that it aimed only at that goal rather than at other 
ends fairly encompassed by the statute's language as well. 
51. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, supra note 2, at 1329-35. 
52. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994); see also Coenen, The 
Rehnquist Court, supra note 2, at 1329 (citing cases and commentary). 
53. Mow Sun Wong v. Campbell, 626 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom., 
Lum v. Campbell, 450 U.S. 959 (1981). 
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discriminatory subsidy if enacted will be upheld is, in practical political 
terms, an exercise of strong-form review because the courts know -
or believe, with good reason - that no discriminatory subsidy will in 
fact be adopted. 
The point about the politics of enacting judicially acceptable 
alternatives can be generalized. The best defense of provisional review 
is that it allows the courts to bring to the legislature's attention consti­
tutional values that it may have overlooked or given less value than 
the courts think it should have. After a provisional invalidation, the 
legislature can take the overlooked value into account or place a new 
weight on the value and enact a new, somewhat modified statute, or 
decide that, all in all, it had placed the correct weight on the value in 
its initial enactment. Provisional review means that the courts should 
uphold the new, modified statute or the old reenacted one. The diffi­
culty with this defense of provisional review is that it overestimates the 
ease with which a legislature can revisit its earlier decisions.54 
Enacted statutes embody a set of political choices and compro­
mises among the members voting for the statutes. Change a statute's 
terms by requiring greater precision or a clearer statement, and you 
change the array of political forces. Someone who might support a 
statute that only indirectly imposes costs on states, for example, might 
be unwilling to support a statute that directly did so. Requiring a clear 
statement in such a situation means, in practical effect, barring 
Congress from imposing the costs at all. Even more generally, "who" 
and "how" requirements increase the cost of legislating (beyond the 
cost that exists in the absence of such requirements). Increase the cost, 
and you diminish the supply. The mechanism is simple: Legislators 
have a lot of things to do, and the more costly you make doing one of 
them, the more readily they switch to doing something else.55 
Seemingly provisional review, then, may not be provisional in 
practice.56 In addition, and perhaps more important in the present con­
text, it is not clear that forms of provisional review provide a strategy 
that courts can use to allocate some issues to strong-form review and 
others to weak-form review. In introducing his analysis, Professor 
Coenen asserts that "the Court confines its use of semisubstantive 
rulings to cases in which the substantive values at stake are (in the 
Court's view) distinctively deserving of judicial protection."57 As the 
54. The quick readoption of the regulation at issue in Hampton shows that the difficul­
ties I have identified are not insurmountable. Notably, though, readopting the regulation 
required only action by the president, not new legislation. I note that even presidential ac­
tion may face impediments as proposals are processed through the executive bureaucracy. 
55. For a brief elaboration of this point, see Mark Tushnet, Judicial Activism or 
Restraint in a Section 33 World, 53 U. TORONTO L.J. 89 (2003). 
56. For a general discussion, see Tushnet, New Forms of Judicial Review, supra note 20, 
at§ IV. 
57. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, supra note 2, at 1283. 
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examples accumulate, though, that assertion seems increasingly ques­
tionable. Professor Coenen shows that the Court uses these devices in 
virtually every area of constitutional law. His later observation, that 
the Court's use of the doctrines is "widespread," seems more 
accurate.58 Professor Coenen connects his argument to Professor Cass 
Sunstein's defense of judicial minimalism, which has been taken as an 
account of what the courts should do across-the-board.59 To the extent 
that Professor Coenen's account describes contemporary U.S. prac­
tice, the Court does not appear to be using the devices as part of an· 
allocation strategy. 
And, perhaps, for good reason. Recall Professor Coenen's formu­
lation, that the Court uses provisional review when "the substantive 
values" are "distinctively deserving of judicial protection."60 But, of 
course, those substantive values are values embodied in the 
Constitution. An allocation strategy predicated on Professor Coenen's 
formulation would lead the courts to sort values embodied in the 
Constitution into two boxes, one containing those "distinctively 
deserving" judicial protection, and the other, it would seem, contain­
ing those deserving judicial protection (given the existence of judicial 
review at all), but not distinctively so.61 Yet, the basis upon which 
constitutional values can be sorted is obscure, or at least is in some 
tension with the underlying theory of strong-form judicial review, 
which calls upon the courts to enforce the constitution as a whole.62 
The devices Professor Coenen analyzes could form the basis for a 
strategy whereby the courts allocate some issues to weak-form review 
58. Id. at 1396. 
59. Id. at 1397-98. Sunstein's own presentation is more qualified. He argues that maxi­
malist decisions are appropriate when a number of conditions are met. Still, I believe 
Coenen is correct in using Sunstein's work in support of a general approach to constitutional 
adjudication, because that is how it has been assimilated into contemporary scholarship. 
60. Id. at 1283. 
61. I simply note that, to the extent that we might think that some constitutional values 
are simply more important than others (along the lines of thinking that the First 
Amendment, for example, is more important than the Statement and Accounts Clause), we 
might think that weak-form or provisional review should be used for the less important 
values, and strong-form review for the more important ones. Alternatively, we might think 
that public attention will focus less on statutes implicating the less important values, thereby 
allowing Congress to reenact statutes provisionally invalidated without additional delibera­
tion, with the implication that strong-form review should be used in connection with the less 
important values, and provisional review in connection with the more important ones. What 
is at stake in this note are the details of an allocation system, and I am more concerned with 
the very possibility of devising such a system than with its details. 
62. Subject only to a minor exclusion of provisions that present political questions, an 
exclusion that is itself difficult to justify within a theory of strong-form judicial review. For 
discussions, see Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 
(1976), and Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The 
Transformation and Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1203 
(2002). 
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and others to strong-form review. Yet, the practice he examines does 
not provide much assurance that such a strategy can sensibly be 
devised. 
B. Thayerian or Tutelary Review 
James Bradley Thayer's classic article on constitutional law 
defended the view that the Supreme Court should invalidate legisla­
tion only when the legislation was manifestly inconsistent with the 
Constitution.63 It is important to stress that Thayerian review is predi­
cated on the assumption that the legislature has indeed made a consti­
tutional error (in the court's eyes), in enacting a statute from whose 
enactment we infer that the legislature believed the statute to be 
constitutional. But, according to Thayer, the court should not set aside 
the legislature's erroneous judgment about what the constitution 
permits unless that judgment was quite seriously wrong. 
True Thayerian review should be distinguished from the far more 
prevalent modern version of deferential review in, as the Supreme 
Court has put it, cases involving social and economic rights.64 In 
upholding a Maryland statute dealing with public assistance to the 
poor and distinguishing between such cases and those involving 
fundamental rights, the Court expressed its view that, by invoking a 
deferential standard of review, "We do not decide today that the 
Maryland regulation is wise, that it best fulfills the relevant social and 
economic objectives that Maryland might ideally espouse, or that a 
more just and humane system could not be devised."65 Similarly, in 
sounding a "cautionary" note about the Court's decision upholding 
Texas's system of financing education primarily through the property 
tax, the Court asserted, "We hardly need add that this Court's action 
today is not to be viewed as placing its judicial imprimatur on the 
status quo. The need is apparent for reform in tax systems which may 
well have relied too long and too heavily on the local property tax."66 
These are claims that the statutes in question may be unwise, rather 
than claims that the statutes are unconstitutional yet nonetheless will 
be accepted by the Court. 
63. James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of 
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). Thayer's formulation was, "It [the court] 
can only disregard the Act when those who have the right to make laws have not merely 
made a mistake, but have made a very clear one - so clear that it is not open to rational 
question." Id. at 144. 
64. The canonical formulation is from Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) 
("In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect."). 
65. Id. at 487. 
66. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 ,  58 (1973). 
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True Thayerian review involves statutes that the court believes to 
be unconstitutional according to the judges' independent assessment 
of the constitution, but which the court nonetheless refrains from 
striking down. It is hard to discover opinions endorsing truly 
Thayerian review. In recent years, the only such opinion of which I am 
aware is Justice Souter's opinion concurring in the judgment in Nixon 
v. United States.67 The case involved a challenge to the constitutionality 
of the Senate's procedure for trying impeachments initially before a 
committee and then on a paper review by the Senate as a whole. 
Justice Souter did not find those procedures unconstitutional, but, he 
wrote, he could "envision different and unusual circumstances that 
might justify a more searching review of impeachment proceedings."68 
These were circumstances in which "the Senate's action might be so 
far beyond the scope of its constitutional authority" that the courts 
should step in.69 Justice Souter's formulation implies that the courts 
might refrain from intervening when the Senate acted beyond its 
constitutional authority, but not "so far beyond" that authority as to 
warrant judicial intervention.70 This is indeed Thayerian review.71 
Why do judges who understand the idea of deference in selected 
areas nonetheless rarely act as true Thayerians? There are, I believe, 
several reasons. First, note that Thayer presented his position as a 
general one, applicable to all constitutional provisions across the 
67. 506 U.S. 224 (1993). 
68. Id. at 253. 
69. Id. at 254 (emphasis added). 
70. Justice Souter's formulation resonates with my own understanding of Thayerian re­
view. An alternative understanding treats Thayerian review as imposing an epistemic re­
quirement on a judge's determination that a statute is unconstitutional. A judge finding a 
statute unconstitutional must, on this understanding, conclude not simply that the statute is 
unconstitutional (based on a full analysis of all the relevant considerations), but that this 
conclusion is clear to a high degree of certainty ("beyond a reasonable doubt," for example). 
Applying epistemic understandings of this sort to the operation of collective institutions like 
courts and juries is notoriously difficult. The standard question is how an individual judge 
can have the required degree of certainty when others (dissenting judges, a minority of ju­
rors, the majority in the legislature) not only do not have that degree of certainty but actu­
ally draw the contrary conclusion from their evaluation of the relevant material? The 
Supreme Court's decisions on the permissibility of nonunanimous jury verdicts, and on the 
requirement that juries be unanimous in finding aggravating circumstances in death penalty 
cases, illustrate the difficulties. See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991) (upholding a capi­
tal conviction based on instructions that did not require jurors to agree unanimously on the 
defendant's state of mind); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (upholding state laws 
allowing nonunanimous verdicts in criminal cases). 
71.  A cousin of Thayerian review can be found in the Supreme Court's doctrine dealing 
with the circumstances under which a federal court can enjoin a pending prosecution under 
an unconstitutional statute. The Court has limited those circumstances quite severely, but it 
has at least held open the possibility that an injunction would be proper against a prosecu­
tion for violating a statute that was " 'flagrantly and patently violative of express constitu­
tional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and 
against whomever an effort might be made to apply it.' " Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 
53-54 (1971) (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941)). 
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board. Treating Thayerian review as part of an allocation strategy, 
whereby some constitutional principles receive strong-form review 
and others Thayerian review, requires the courts to distinguish among 
constitutional provisions. As we have seen in connection with provi­
sional review, drawing such distinctions in turn requires the courts to 
place constitutional provisions on a continuum, some being more 
important - in some sense - than others. Yet, all constitutional pro­
visions have received the same degree of endorsement by the constitu­
tion's makers, and the grounds for judicial distinctions among the pro­
visions are quite unclear. The most sustained discussion of which 
I am aware of distinctions among constitutional rights in Supreme 
Court opinions is Justice White's assertion in Bowers v. Hardwick,12 
that the "Court . . .  comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with 
judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in 
the language or design of the Constitutio11." Yet, this assertion seems 
in serious tension with the Ninth Amendment.73 Similarly, the asser­
tion in Murdock v. Pennsylvania,74 that First Amendment rights had a 
"preferred position," never received an extended defense. 
Second, as Justice Souter's formulation suggests, Thayerian review 
requires the creation of another continuum. Ordinarily, we think of 
constitutionality as a binary phenomenon: While it may sometimes be 
hard to figure out whether a statute crosses the line from constitu­
tional permissibility into constitutional violation, we are confident that 
there is such a line. In Thayerian review, constitutionality is a matter 
of degree: Unconstitutional, but not too unconstitutional; an error, but 
not a clear error. The U.S. experience does not give me confidence 
that judges can figure out ways to develop a continuumized notion of 
constitutionality.75 
Third, I suspect that true Thayerian review places judges in a diffi­
cult psychological position. The state of mind needed for merely def­
erential review is easy to achieve. All the judge needs to say is, "I 
would not vote for this were I a legislator, because I believe it is 
unwise policy, but - even as a legislator - I wouldn't think that the 
proposal is unconstitutional." The state of mind of a Thayerian judge 
is, I suspect, harder to achieve. The Thayerian judge must say, "In my 
judgment this statute is unconstitutional, but - despite that, and 
72. 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986). 
73. U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."). 
74. 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943). 
75. My guess, but it is only that, is that strong-form review conduces to making 
continuumization difficult: A lot of the time the courts will be invoking the constitution 
understood in binary terms (because such terms make it easier to explain to legislatures and 
to the people why their choices cannot go into effect in the short run), thereby depriving the 
courts of many opportunities to design the continuum of unconstitutionality. 
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despite the fact that I have the power to block the statute's enforce­
ment 
- I think that this statute should go into effect because it is not 
too unconstitutional." Judges accustomed to acting on their judgments 
of constitutionality may find it hard to refrain from doing so on some 
occasions.76 
A fourth reason for skepticism about the possibility of Thayerian 
review as an allocation strategy for judges is related to the third. A 
judge, given the choice between exercising strong-form review and 
exercising Thayerian review, might wonder what could be accom­
plished by doing the latter.77 I have suggested elsewhere that the 
Thayerian judge might think of his or her choice as tutelary: The judge 
might instruct legislators on their constitutional obligations by telling 
them that the statute they have enacted is unconstitutional and that 
they have to live with that unconstitutionality.78 The state of mind of 
the Thayerian judge might be that of a wise parent, willing to let his or 
her children make decisions that the parent believes to be unsound so 
that the children will learn from experience how to make sound ones.79 
The difficulty with the tutelary view is obvious. Why should legisla­
tors who believe that the statute they enacted accomplishes valuable 
public purposes care that judges think that the legislature's action 
violates constitutional norms? Sometimes, perhaps, the legislators will 
have overlooked the constitutional problems the Thayerian court 
identifies. Having those difficulties pointed out, the legislature might 
reassess the overall wisdom of the statute, deducting the constitutional 
costs the court identified from the social benefits the legislature ini­
tially identified and, perhaps, concluding that, net, the statute does not 
actually advance the public well-being. And, sometimes, perhaps, an 
aroused citizenry will become upset that their representatives have 
been faithful to the constituents' immediate desires, or perhaps faith­
ful only to the legislators' immediate self-interest,80 but unfaithful to 
76. I have a similar suspicion about the epistemic version of Thayerian review. That ver­
sion will sometimes require judges to say to themselves, "I am convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt that this statute is unconstitutional even though four of my colleagues, 
whose judgment is not always unreasonable, believe quite to the contrary, that the statute is 
entirely constitutional." 
77. It is clear enough what is accomplished by exercising strong-form review: An uncon­
stitutional statute is not enforced. 
78. Mark Tushnet, Thayer's Target: Judicial Review or Democracy?, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 
9 (1993). There I argue that Thayer himself viewed Thayerian review as tutelary. I should 
note that even at the time this article was published I was not convinced by my own argu­
ment, although I thought then and still do that there were tutelary themes in Thayer's arti­
cle. For present purposes, though, Thayer's own understanding is unimportant, as I am 
concerned here with problems Thayerian review poses for judges. 
79. I note that in my experience parents have difficulty in achieving this state of mind. 
80. On the assumption that the legislators' actions might not correspond to the constitu­
ents' immediate preferences because of agency problems. 
August 2003] Alternative Forms of Judicial Review 2801 
the constituents' longer-term commitments as expressed in the consti­
tution. 
More likely, though, neither legislators nor constituents will think 
it necessary to respond to the Thayerian court's decision. The reason 
is that statutes often express a considered judgment by the legislature 
that the statutes are consistent with the constitution, and that such a 
judgment is (often) reasonable even if the judges disagree.81 Here we 
can return to Marbury itself. As is well-known, Marshall's opinion 
uses a rhetorical trick to explain his justification of judicial review. He 
asks readers to imagine a statute enacted by Congress that makes 
testimony by one witness sufficient to convict for treason, blatantly 
contradicting the constitutional requirement of two witnesses.82 In 
such a case Congress could not reasonably have thought that its action 
was consistent with the Constitution. But, consider the statute at issue 
in Marbury itself, which the Court held unconstitutional because it 
altered the allocation of jurisdiction prescribed in the Constitution. It 
is a standard point in the Marbury literature to note that the 
Constitution could reasonably be interpreted to allow Congress to 
shift cases from the constitutionally identified category of appellate 
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction.83 Most real­
world cases are more likely to resemble Marbury than to resemble the 
hypothetical treason statute. And, in such cases, judges exercising 
Thayerian tutelary review will confront a legislature whose members 
can reasonably say to themselves, "We understand that the court's 
interpretation of the constitution is reasonable, and different from 
ours, but we also understand that our interpretation is a reasonable 
one too. Given the choice between two reasonable interpretations, we 
will adhere to our initial judgment." In short, a Thayerian court may 
hope to teach the legislature a lesson about the legislature's constitu­
tional obligations, but the students are likely to think the lesson 
unnecessary. 
These problems with true Thayerian review suggest that courts will 
have difficulty pursuing a defensible strategy in which they allocate 
some issues to strong-form review and others to Thayerian review. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In asserting that judicial review was necessary to ensure that "the 
legislature may [not] alter the constitution by an ordinary act,"84 Chief 
81.  For a more extended discussion, see Mark Tushnet, Non-Judicial Review, 40 HARV. 
J. ON LEGIS. 453 (2003) .  
82. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179 (1803). 
83. See, e.g., William Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE 
L.J. 1, 31-32. 
84. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. 
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Justice Marshall may be taken to assert as well that constitutionalism 
requires strong-form judicial review. Weak-form review suggests that 
there is a category lying between ordinary legislation and extraordi­
nary constitutional amendment.85 With the possibility of weak-form 
review on the table, it becomes possible to consider as well strategies 
that would allocate some issues to strong-form review, others to 
weak-form review. 
Here I have explored some aspects of allocation strategies operat­
ing one level removed from that of constitutional design. I have sug­
gested that allocation strategies may be unstable: A legislative alloca­
tion that appears to give courts the power to engage in strong-form 
review may be revoked, and judicial allocations that appear to commit 
the courts to weak-form review may, in practical political terms, 
amount to strong-form review in disguise. More generally, allocation 
strategies may be designed, consciously or otherwise, to conceal the 
reality of judicial review - in the one case, to pretend that courts 
really do have the power to resolve contentious issues permanently, in 
the other to pretend that the courts are permitting the people to be 
truly self-governing in the areas subject to weak-form review. 
Weak-form judicial review, and the possibilities of allocation strategies 
it creates, are intriguing novelties in constitutional design. It remains 
to be seen, though, how permanent, enduring, and distinctive their 
contribution to constitutional design is. 
85. Of course, constitutionalist systems lacking judicial review - such as Great 
Britain's, at least before the adoption of the Human Rights Act 1998 - show that Marshall's 
claim that constitutionalism requires judicial review is false. What he missed about such sy�­
tems was the possibility that embedded political norms would place impediments in the way 
of changing the constitution at least as severe as those created by cumbersome, formal 
amendment procedures. 
